PEENE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

6/21/2010 6:11 PM

LUX FOR LESS: EBAY’S LIABILITY TO LUXURY BRANDS
FOR THE SALE OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS
∗

Brandon Peene
I.

INTRODUCTION

EBay deems itself the world’s largest online marketplace, acting
as a conduit for registered buyers and sellers around the world to
come together to buy and sell an endless variety of goods and servic1
es. The company embraces the fact that it “connects hundreds of
millions of people around the world every day, empowering them to
2
explore new opportunities and innovate together.” EBay’s market
3
value is estimated to be around $30 billion. The auction house re4
ported 2008 revenues of $8.5 billion, has approximately 248 million
5
registered users across the globe, and disclosed a total value of
6
$59.65 billion in goods and services sold on its site in 2008.
One of the “new opportunities” created by eBay is that of providing its users the opportunity to sell counterfeit goods to unsuspecting
7
buyers. EBay’s configuration helps those who traffic in counterfeit
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J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Political Science, 2007,
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1
See Emily Favre, Comment, Online Auction Houses: How Trademark Owners Protect
Brand Integrity Against Counterfeiting, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 165, 171 (2007).
2
Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Inc. Applauds Court’s Rejection of Tiffany Counterfeit Claims (July 14, 2008), available at http://investor.ebay.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=322126.
3
See eBay, Inc.—Stock Quote Analysis at a Glance, FORBES, Nov. 11, 2009,
http://finapps.forbes.com/finapps/jsp/finance/compinfo/CIAtAGlance.jsp?tkr=EB
AY.
4
eBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Feb. 11, 2009), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ebay/749841999x0x281367/1b773a7c8c14-45b8-915a-1716ca37dda0/eBay_2008AR.pdf.
5
Katie Hafner, Tiffany and eBay in a Fight Over Fakes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at
C9.
6
eBay Inc., Annual Report, supra note 4, at 51.
7
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The rapid development of the Internet and websites like
eBay have created new ways for sellers and buyers to connect to each other and to
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goods due to the ability of users to access eBay in relative anonymity,
the vast amount of items listed at any given time, and the short time
8
frame in which auctions can be completed. Although eBay is not the
only online auction house where these illicit activities occur, its
strength, popularity, and profitability make it a significant target for
trademark owners whose brands are being illegally peddled on eBay
9
and who are unable or unwilling to pursue individual counterfeiters.
These brand owners have alleged that eBay is liable for contributory
trademark infringement for providing a forum for illegal transactions
to occur, for failing to take reasonable steps to police its listings, and
10
for looking the other way to profit from illegal sales.
Therefore, some brand owners, particularly those who own what
are referred to as “luxury brands,” have taken action against eBay for
providing an arena to facilitate and profit from the sale of counterfeit
goods. Nevertheless, countries involved thus far in adjudicating these
suits are divided in determining eBay’s culpability. In particular, several important cases decided in 2008 produced drastically different
outcomes, only increasing confusion among those seeking more de11
fined answers as to eBay’s liability to brand owners. On June 30,
2008, France’s Commercial Court of Paris ruled that eBay failed to
adequately police for counterfeit goods in transactions involving
Louis Vuitton Malleteir (Louis Vuitton) and Christian Dior Couture
(Christian Dior), two brands owned by the Louis Vuitton Moët Hen12
nessy (LVMH) group. The court ruled that LVMH was entitled to

expand their businesses beyond geographical limits. These new markets have also,
however, given counterfeiters new opportunities to expand their reach.”).
8
See Favre, supra note 1, at 168.
9
See Mary M. Calkins, Alexei Nikitkov & Vernon Richardson, Mineshafts on Treasure Island: A Relief Map of the eBay Fraud Landscape, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1,
35–36 (2007), http://tlp.law.pitt.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Calkins.pdf.
10
See Dara Chevlin, Student Article, Schemes and Scams: Auction Fraud and the Culpability of Host Auction Web Sites, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 223, 231 (2005); see also Favre, supra note 1, at 179 (citing the standard for contributory copyright infringement).
11
See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469; Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [Commercial Court of Paris], June 30, 2008, General Docket no. 2006077799 [hereinafter
Louis
Vuitton
Case],
available
at
http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/media/
FrenchOpinions.pdf; Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [Commercial Court of Paris],
June 30, 2008, General Docket no. 2006077807 [hereinafter Christian Dior Case],
available at http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/media/FrenchOpinions.pdf; see also Brad
Stone, EBay Cleared in Site’s Sales of Knockoffs, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at C1.
12
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 17; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 17–
18.
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damages of approximately $63.2 million. Yet, weeks later, on July
14, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, followed later by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, ruled in favor of eBay in a case brought by Tiffany & Co. (Tiffany), the jewelry manufacturer, holding that eBay took reasonable
steps to prevent counterfeit sales and acted appropriately when
14
alerted of specific counterfeit listings.
These starkly differing decisions and interpretations of similar
facts put eBay in a position where its liability appears to depend on
15
the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Such differing judicial interpreta16
tions, or “country splits,” hold important ramifications for eBay and
the survival of its business model. Inconsistencies in rulings can
17
prompt a flood of lawsuits, establish different legal duties eBay owes
18
to brand owners depending on the countries involved, and likely
create a situation where past, pending, and future litigation will in19
crease costs on both eBay and its users.
This Comment seeks to examine the consequences of country
splits in determining eBay’s liability to luxury brands for the sale of
counterfeit items, as well as the appropriate standard to assess wheth13

Christina Passariello & Mylene Mangalindan, EBay Fined Over Selling Counterfeits—French Court Orders Online Retailer to Pay Louis Vuitton, Other Luxury LVMH Brands
$63.2 Million, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2008, at B1.
14
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). The court also held that “rights holders bear the principal responsibility to police their trademarks.” Id.
15
See Roger Parloff, EBay Wins L’Oréal Counterfeiting Case in Belgium, FORTUNE,
Aug. 12, 2008, http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/08/12/ebay-wins-lorealcounterfeiting-case-in-belgium/.
16
This Comment uses the phrase “country splits” as a shorthand way of describing the differing interpretations of eBay’s liability by courts and jurisdictions
throughout the world. The use of the phrase is similar to that of “circuit splits,”
which refers to differing judicial interpretations of a similar legal issue between two
or more U.S. Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. County of
Denver, 540 U.S. 1027, 560 (2003) (discussing two divergent views among the Courts
of Appeals as being “worthy of the Court’s review because it presents a clear Circuit
split”).
17
See Suzy Jagger, EBay Braced for Copycat Lawsuits Over Fakes, TIMES (London), July
2, 2008, at 42.
18
See Carol Matlack, LVMH vs. eBay: A Counterfeit Suit, BUS. WK., Sept. 22, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/sep2006/gb20060922_888836.ht
m?chan=top+news_top+news+index_global+business.
19
See Linda Rosencrance, French Ruling on Counterfeit Goods Could Have FarJuly
7,
2008,
Reaching
Effects
for
eBay,
COMPUTERWORLD,
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9106618/French_ruling_on_counterfeit_
goods_could_have_far_reaching_effects_for_eBay.
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er eBay has taken the necessary steps to police its forums for infringing listings. This Comment contends that eBay’s current initiatives,
most notably its Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) Program, are sufficient in their reasonableness, efficiency, and effectiveness to shield
20
eBay from liability in most situations. A contrary standard holding
eBay liable for each infringing listing, regardless of whether it is
aware of the listing, would be unacceptable, unreasonable, and impracticable in an age where individuals are increasingly engaging in
commerce over the Internet. Moreover, this Comment asserts that a
second impetus to litigation is the aspiration of luxury-brand owners
to prevent their authentic goods from being sold on legitimate secondary markets at cheaper prices, which thereby diminishes a particular item’s reputation as a luxury.
Part II will examine eBay’s business model and its anticounterfeiting efforts. Part III will analyze the divergences amongst
various nations in determining eBay’s liability. Part IV will analyze
the ramifications going forward of these country splits for eBay and
its users. In Part V, this Comment argues that eBay satisfies its duty
with its current and past policing efforts and that brand owners have
the responsibility to take a primary role in policing for counterfeit
goods with the expectation that eBay will act when alerted of an infringing listing. Finally, in Part VI, this Comment seeks to promote a
worldwide standard for assessing eBay’s liability and uses as a primary
vehicle the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),
which is presently being negotiated by countries who disagree over
how to assess eBay’s liability.
II. EBAY’S BUSINESS MODEL AND POLICING EFFORTS
A. EBay’s Business Model
EBay’s success and continuous growth are a testament to its laissez-faire business model, through which it connects people around
the world by providing a platform for diverse forms of commerce to
21
take place under minimal supervision. This structure has caused
eBay to grow by leaps and bounds in a relatively short period of time.
For example, in 1995, the first eBay auction closed on a broken laser

20

See eBay Inc., Reporting Intellectual Property Infringements (VeRO),
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html (last visited May 19, 2010)
(describing VeRO’s mandate and reporting procedure).
21
See Press Release, eBay Inc., supra note 2.
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pointer that was sold for fourteen dollars. By 2004, eBay had more
23
than 1.3 billion listings annually, and it currently lists more than 140
24
million auctions on any given day. EBay allows buyers and sellers to
negotiate on the purchase of anything “from jewelry and beauty sup25
plies to cars and antiques.” Most importantly, eBay requires buyers
and sellers to carry out the transactions themselves: “[w]hile eBay
provides the venue for the sale and support for the transaction, it
26
does not itself sell the items.” EBay calls itself a “venue, not an auc27
tioneer,” supplies a service, not a product, and gives users a forum
28
and nothing else. Thus, the items sold never actually come into
eBay’s possession, and eBay generally does not know if the buyer ever
29
receives the item from the seller.
Also, eBay does not take responsibility for vetting its millions of
listings in advance because the cost- and labor-intensive nature of inspection would destroy the benefits of its laissez-faire business mod-

22

ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY 4–5 (2003).
Fara S. Sunderji, Note, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. Problem, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 935 (2005) (citing eBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22
(Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/
000095013405003827/f0542 6e10vk.htm#010).
24
eBay Inc., Annual Report, supra note 4, at 2.
25
Sunderji, supra note 23, at 912–13.
26
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
27
Chevlin, supra note 10, at 233.
28
See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 933. For instance, the eBay User Agreement
states,
You will not hold eBay responsible for other users’ content, actions,
or inactions, items they list or their destruction of allegedly fake items.
You acknowledge that we are not a traditional auctioneer. Instead, our
sites are venues to allow anyone to offer, sell, and buy just about anything, at anytime, from anywhere, in a variety of pricing formats and
locations, such as Stores, fixed price formats, and auction-style formats.
We are not involved in the actual transaction between buyers and sellers. While we may help facilitate the resolution of disputes through
various programs, we have no control over and do not guarantee the
quality, safety, or legality of items advertised, the truth or accuracy of
users’ content or listings, the ability of sellers to sell items, the ability of
buyers to pay for items, or that a buyer or seller will actually complete a
transaction or return an item.
eBay Inc., Your User Agreement (effective Sept. 29, 2009), http://pages.ebay.com/
help/policies/user-agreement.html (last visited May 19, 2010).
29
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
23
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30

el. Nevertheless, eBay exercises some control over buyers and sellers
by requiring them to register with eBay and consent to its User
31
Agreement. To sell on eBay, an individual or entity must register,
establish a seller ID, and verify that ID, primarily through a credit
32
card, debit account, or bank information. Sellers can then list the
item in a category of their choosing, either through an auction set to
end at a specific time or through the “Buy it Now” feature, wherein a
buyer can purchase the item at a fixed price and instantly end the
33
auction. When a buyer wins an auction, eBay sends an electronic
notice to the buyer and seller with the expectation that the two users
will contact each other within three days to discuss payment and
34
shipment of the listed item.
EBay earns a percentage of the value of every sale, including a
flat fee, and thereby receives revenue from the sale of legitimate and
35
counterfeit goods alike. Sellers must pay eBay an insertion fee to list
an item, which usually ranges from $0.20 to $4.80, depending on the
36
initial listing price. If the item is sold, sellers pay to eBay a final value fee, ranging from 5 to 10 percent of the sale price of the auc37
tioned item. Sellers are also able to pay eBay additional fees to use
promotional features and selling tools, such as seminars on how to

30

See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 916.
EBay’s User Agreement declares,
Without limiting other remedies, we may limit, suspend, or terminate our service and user accounts, prohibit access to our sites and
their content, services, and tools, delay or remove hosted content, and
take technical and legal steps to keep users off the sites if we think that
they are creating problems or possible legal liabilities, infringing the
intellectual property rights of third parties, or acting inconsistently
with the letter or spirit of our policies. We also reserve the right to
cancel unconfirmed accounts or accounts that have been inactive for a
long time, or to modify or discontinue eBay sites, services, or tools.
eBay Inc., supra note 28. EBay also prohibits the sale of certain items, such as firearms, drugs, and alcohol. Id.; eBay, Inc., Prohibited and Restricted Items—Overview,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/items-ov.html (last visited May 19, 2010)
32
Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 6.
33
Id. at 6–7.
34
Id. at 10.
35
See id. at 3; see also Handbagged; EBay’s Legal Woes, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2008, at
76, 76.
36
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
37
Id.
31
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create the perfect listing and marketing calendars to correspond with
38
holidays, and to use eBay consultants to help grow their businesses.
B. EBay’s Policing Efforts
Since its inception, eBay has taken measures to combat the sale
of counterfeit goods. The primary motivation to crack down on
counterfeit sales within its forums is to establish and maintain the
goodwill and trust of its users because preventing innocent buyers
from purchasing falsely labeled goods is critical to both eBay’s bot39
tom line and reputation. In 1997, eBay established “Legal Buddy,” a
program in which eBay collaborated with brand owners by manually
going through and removing specific auctions after being alerted by a
40
brand owner that a listed item was counterfeit. Later, in May 2002,
eBay began employing its fraud engine, which used complex models
41
to search for suspicious activity in its listings. Prior to the fraud en42
gine, eBay was only able to sift through the listings manually.
Furthermore, the overarching principle of eBay’s anticounterfeiting strategy is to put the onus on brand owners to bear the
primary responsibility of policing eBay for trademark violations. The
primary vehicle used to carry out this policy is eBay’s main anti43
counterfeiting device, the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) Program.
Under VeRO, an auction can be closed down based on a brand own44
Only VeROer’s “good faith belief” that a listed item is fake.
registered brand owners can report potentially infringing items
45
through the program. A member brand owner alerts eBay by filing
46
a Notice of Claimed Infringement (NOCI). Upon being alerted,
47
eBay can then remove the item. EBay also works with brand owners
through VeRO by employing additional mechanisms, such as saving
searches, providing a program that automatically searches for particular listings, and cooperating with brand owners seeking personal in38

Id.; Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 7.
See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 939.
40
Id. at 915–16.
41
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
42
Id. EBay currently spends $5 million a year on the fraud engine. Id.
43
See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 916; Handbagged; EBay’s Legal Woes, supra note 35,
at 76; eBay Inc., supra note 20.
44
eBay Inc., supra note 20.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
39
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48

formation on alleged infringers. VeRO members are also encouraged to create “About Me” pages to provide eBay users with information regarding a brand owner’s legal positions and products listed on
49
eBay that are likely to be counterfeit.
Additionally, eBay employs targeted efforts to fight counterfeiting in particularly vulnerable areas, such as in clothing and luxury
handbags. EBay’s current initiatives include limiting the number of
items a seller can list at one time, preventing short auctions for certain items, and prohibiting sellers in Hong Kong and mainland China, where counterfeit trafficking is most pronounced, from listing
50
items prone to counterfeiting.
According to eBay, when a trademark violation occurs, eBay acts
51
expeditiously to remove the infringing listing. EBay removes thou52
sands of auctions per week through VeRO. Statistics indicate that
items alerted through VeRO are removed 90 percent of the time
within twenty-four hours, 70–80 percent of the time within twelve
hours, and 75 percent of the time within four hours of being
53
alerted. EBay has also put substantial resources into fighting counterfeit-goods trafficking. The online-auction house spends more than
$20 million each year to find and remove fake items, employs over
two thousand individuals to fight counterfeiting, and is currently
partners with approximately eighteen thousand brand owners
54
through VeRO.
EBay places the onus on brand owners to be the primary investigators of counterfeit items because it asserts that brand owners have
the expertise and ability to spot counterfeit items more responsibly
and efficiently. The auction house contends that “[v]etting each and
48

Id.
See eBay Inc., VeRO: Participant About Me Pages, http://pages.ebay.com/
help/community/vero-aboutme.html (last visited May 19, 2010). For instance, both
Tiffany and Hermès, two companies that have sued eBay over the listing of counterfeit items, have “About Me” pages and are members of VeRO. Id.
50
Brad Stone, EBay Says Its Crackdown on Fraud Is Showing Results, N.Y. TIMES, June
14, 2007, at C9.
51
Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Vows to Fight for E-Commerce Following Overreach by Luxury Brands Manufacturer (June 30, 2008), available at
http://investor.ebay.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=319007.
52
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
53
Id. at 478; Roger Parloff, EBay Triumphs in Tiffany Counterfeiting Case, FORTUNE,
July 14, 2008, http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/07/14/ebay-triumphs-intiffany-counterfeiting-case/.
54
Press Release, eBay Inc., supra note 51.
49
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every product before it goes up for sale online is not an option” because of the cost and inefficiency in spotting potential fakes by inex55
perienced investigators. Moreover, according to an eBay spokesman, Hani Durzy, “[W]e don’t have any expertise. We’re not
clothing experts. We’re not car experts, and we’re not jewelry experts. We’re experts at building a marketplace and bringing buyers
56
and sellers together.” EBay also contends that brand owners are in a
better position to determine real and fake products because eBay
57
never takes physical possession of the items; hence, policing is a task
better suited to those who specialize in manufacturing the goods be58
ing imitated.
III. COUNTRY SPLITS IN DETERMINING EBAY’S LIABILITY
Despite eBay’s policing efforts, counterfeiters continue to sell
counterfeit goods on eBay, prompting brand owners whose trademarks are infringed to respond by bringing suit in courts across the
world. Recent cases decided in Europe and the United States have
put eBay in a position in which its liability appears to rest upon where
a particular lawsuit is filed. The seminal cases are contradictory
judgments from France and the United States. The Commercial
Court of Paris found in favor of French company LVMH in two separate decisions involving its brands Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior.
In contrast, a U.S. district court decision, later affirmed by the
Second Circuit, found in favor of eBay in litigation brought by Tiffany. These cases, although based on similar facts, come to drastically
different outcomes, and therefore only increase the confusion over
how eBay should operate its business.
55

Vidya
Ram,
EBay’s
Faux
Pas,
FORBES,
June
9,
2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/09/ebay-counterfeit-hermes-tech-entercx_vr_0609ebay.html.
56
Katie Hafner, Seeing Fakes, Angry Traders Confront EBay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2006, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/technology/
29ebay.html.
57
For instance, during the Tiffany litigation, eBay’s lawyer stated that “[o]nly Tiffany, after all, has the necessary expertise and resources—including tools, trained
evaluators, access to catalogues, and so on—to distinguish between authentic and
counterfeit Tiffany products.” Chad Bray, Tiffany Disputes eBay’s Model, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 26, 2008, at B5C. Moreover, eBay alerts trademark owners that “because eBay
cannot be an expert in your intellectual property rights in over 25,000 categories,
and cannot verify that sellers have the right to sell the millions of items they post on
eBay each day,” it must rely on the trademark owners to identify listings that infringe
on their rights and to bring it to eBay’s attention. eBay Inc., supra note 20.
58
See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 935–36.
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A. Litigation Between LVMH and eBay
On June 30, 2008, the Commercial Court of Paris sided with
LVMH in lawsuits brought against eBay in cases involving two of its
labels, Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior, holding that eBay did not
take the steps necessary to prohibit the sale of counterfeit goods on
59
its Web sites. Louis Vuitton “designs, manufactures and markets
leather goods and luxury ready-to-wear products worldwide under the
Louis Vuitton trademark” and “enjoys exceptional worldwide renown
60
which places it among the world’s most prestigious trademarks.”
Christian Dior’s reputation makes its products “highly sought after,
thus giving rise to numerous counterfeit products and various activities in the nature of commercial parasitism” under the Christian Dior
61
label. Although these brands are known to be counterfeited, Louis
62
Vuitton and Christian Dior are not members of VeRO.
LVMH proclaimed that the vast majority of the hundreds of
thousands of listings on eBay related to Christian Dior and Louis
63
Vuitton are counterfeit. Based on eBay’s data, there were 149,739
64
listings from April 2006 to June 2006 related to Louis Vuitton.
These listings led to 96,581 actual sales with an average sale price of
65
96.50. Also, 316,904 listings from April 2006 to June 2006 were related to Christian Dior, and 107,825 sales were completed therefrom
with an average price, depending on the item, ranging from 15.80 to
66
44.60. LVMH asserted that, of these listings, ninety percent were
67
fake.
Moreover, LVMH alleged that eBay ignored repeated warnings
since 1999 to take action to prevent the sale of counterfeit LVMH
products, which LVMH claims caused damage to its brands all over
68
the world. For example, Christian Dior accused eBay of “having
59

Passariello & Mangalindan, supra note 13.
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 9.
61
Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 9.
62
See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 8; see also Christian Dior Case, supra note
11, at 8.
63
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 13; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 13.
64
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 13.
65
Id.
66
Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 13.
67
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 13; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 13;
see also Matlack, supra note 18.
68
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 7 (alleging that eBay failed “to take effective measures aimed at preventing infringement, such as . . . forcing the sellers to
60
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failed to ensure, as it had a duty to do, that its activity did not generate any unlawful acts” and that “eBay’s willingness to host advertising
listings that were manifestly unlawful on all its sites . . . encouraged
69
the selling of counterfeit items.”
The luxury-brand group also
charged that eBay committed tortious acts of negligence by failing to
provide effective means to prevent the sale of counterfeits, which allowed eBay to foster illicit trade for the deliberate purpose of deriv70
ing income from illegal activity.
LVMH, and later the French court, took the position that eBay is
not simply a forum for buyers and sellers to interact but is also a bro71
ker participating in the actual transactions.
Thus, LVMH maintained that eBay was not entitled to liability protection under French
or European Community law, which provide limited liability to “hos72
ters” who are merely technical-service providers.
The relevant
French Law, Article 6-1-2 of the French Law for Confidence in the
73
Digital Economy, is based on Article 14 of the European Community
74
Directive on electronic commerce (Article 14), which set the stanstate that they guarantee the genuineness of the products . . . or . . . terminating the
account of any seller at the first offense”); Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 3
(claiming that the damages to LVMH also occurred in “Germany, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, China, Korea, Spain, the United States, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New-Zealand, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, the
United Kingdom, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan”).
69
Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 2.
70
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 10.
71
Id. at 7–8.
72
Id.
73
Article 6-1-2 states that “hosters” are:
1. Individuals or entities that provide, even gratuitously, for provision
of public services to the public online communication, the storage of
signals, writings, images, sounds or messages of any kind provided by
recipients of these services may not incur liability as a result of activities
or information stored at the request of a recipient of these services if
they did not have actual knowledge of their unlawful character or facts
and circumstances showing that character or if, from the moment they
had this knowledge, they acted promptly to remove such data or make
access impossible.
The preceding paragraph does not apply when the recipient of service is acting under the authority or control of the person referred to
therein.
Law No. 2004-575 of June 21, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 22, 2004, p. 11,168 (translated from
French).
74
Article 14 states that:
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member
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dard for a “hoster” to escape liability. Article 14 states that a hoster is
granted liability protection if (1) it does not have actual knowledge of
infringing activity or is not aware of circumstances where illegal activity could be apparent or (2) if it does have actual knowledge, it acts
75
“expeditiously” to remove or prevent access to the illegal activity.
EBay countered that it is a hoster and therefore entitled to liabil76
ity protection. The auction house also stated that “it participates fully in the struggle against infringement by constantly reminding the
users of its sites of compliance with the laws and regulations” and by
77
“setting up [VeRO to help] protect intellectual property.”
Nevertheless, the Commercial Court of Paris found against eBay
78
in both cases. Most importantly, the court determined that eBay was
not entitled to protection under Article 6-1-2 or Article 14. According to the court, because eBay receives a commission based on its services, it is not a mere hoster but a broker acting as an intermediary
79
between buyers and sellers. The court looked to several factors in
reaching this decision.
First, the court ruled that eBay’s status as a broker signifies both
80
knowledge and control over its forums and listings. Because the
court found that eBay had actual knowledge of infringing listings,
represented by eBay’s awareness of general counterfeiting activity,
eBay should have known of the possibility of counterfeit sales due to
81
the prices and volume of LVMH products sold on its sites. AccorStates shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition
that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider.
Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13.
75
Id.
76
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 10.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 12; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 12.
79
See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 11.
80
See id.; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 11.
81
See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 12. For instance, the court noted that
some auction captions stated that the product was “a fine imitation of a famous Louis
Vuitton design.” Id.
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dingly, it appears that general knowledge of counterfeit activity, without specific knowledge of particular listings, is sufficient to put eBay
on notice of infringing items in France.
Second, according to the Commercial Court of Paris, eBay exercised sufficient control over its users to justify denying it liability protection. The court found that eBay violated Article 6-1-2, because an
eBay user “acts under the control or authority of the hosting site”
since users have to sign up for eBay, and eBay has the power to re82
move both listings and users. The court also noted that “eBay’s par83
ticipation is essential in the selling of counterfeit products.” EBay
establishes programs and relationships with users to ensure the promotion and development of auctions and is a “mandatory player in
sales taking place . . . [by undertaking] a very active role . . . to increase the number of transactions generating commissions for its
84
benefit.”
The French court also stressed that eBay failed to establish effective policing measures and profited from its facilitation of unlawful
85
illicit goods trading. The court deemed the establishment of VeRO
evidence of eBay’s previous negligence, stating that “although measures have recently been taken by eBay, this only goes to show that it
has been negligent in the past . . . and . . . therefore it is aware that it
86
is wholly and entirely liable.”
Subsequent to its liability determination, the Commercial Court
of Paris handed down a significant damages judgment and injunction
against eBay. In total, eBay must pay approximately 40 million, or
about $63 million, to various LVMH brands and is prevented from
listing certain genuine perfumes made by LVMH pursuant to the in87
junction. European Union (EU) Member States are permitted to
enact laws prohibiting the sale of authentic products outside of a se82

Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 11.
Id. at 12.
84
Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 11.
85
See id. at 10; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 10. “[S]uch essential participation by eBay in the marketing of products infringing, in particular, the [LVMH]
trademarks constitutes tortious activity.” Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 12.
86
Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 12.
87
Ladka Bauerova, EBay is Ordered to Pay $63 Million in LVMH Lawsuit,
BLOOMBERG, June
30,
2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601085&sid=a3zlHJ0UYAcc. For instance, 19.28 million is to be paid to Louis
Vuitton and 16.4 million to Christian Dior fashion. Id. The court also allocated
3.19 million to the makers of Christian Dior, Kenzo, Givenchy, and Guerlain perfumes. Id.
83
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88

lective distribution network. Consequently, the ruling not only requires eBay to block all sales of counterfeit Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior products, but also sales of authentic perfumes owned by
89
LVMH that are listed by unauthorized distributors. Thus, the listing
of both real and fake goods on eBay can subject eBay to potential liability under French law, severely impacting eBay and its laissez-faire
business model.
B. Litigation Between Tiffany and eBay
On July 14, 2008, in an opinion rendered by Judge Richard J.
Sullivan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, eBay escaped liability in a case brought by Tiffany for the sale of
90
counterfeit items. Tiffany is personified by its trademark blue box,
91
and its jewelry symbolizes luxury and wealth. The jewelry manufacturer does not sell its goods through discount stores and closely con92
trols the distribution of its authorized goods.
Tiffany filed suit
against eBay in 2004 for contributory trademark infringement, claiming that eBay continuously allowed the sale of items falsely bearing
the Tiffany label when eBay was aware that counterfeit items were
93
auctioned on eBay.
Tiffany argued that the majority of jewelry offered for sale on
eBay using the “Tiffany” trademark is counterfeit and that eBay profited from these sales while taking inadequate steps to prevent the

88

See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 81, Mar. 25, 1957, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 64–65 (describing exceptions allowing
agreements and business practices by Member States that lead to the “prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition” in the marketplace).
89
The LVMH perfumes are Kenzo, Guerlain, Christian Dior, and Givenchy.
Press Release, eBay.fr, Suite de la décision de justice rendue la 30 juin dernier [Following the Court Order Issued Last June 30] (July 11, 2008), available at
http://actualites.ebay.fr/showitem&id=396; see also Ryan Kim, EBay to Appeal Huge
French Counterfeit Ruling, S.F. GATE, July 1, 2008, available at http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=c/a/2008/07/01/BUEP11HILD.DTL.
90
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Stone, supra note 11.
91
See Favre, supra note 1, at 165. “For over 150 years, Tiffany has achieved great
renown as a purveyor of high quality goods . . . such as jewelry, silver, china, glassware, decorative objects, crystal, and clocks, under the trademark and trade name
TIFFANY and its variant TIFFANY & CO.” First Amended Complaint at ¶ 8, Tiffany,
576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (No. 04 Civ. 4607), 2004 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 9530.
92
First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at ¶¶ 10–11.
93
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
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94

transactions. Tiffany claimed eBay had notice that a problem with
counterfeit Tiffany goods existed but violated its obligation to investigate and prevent the illicit activities by (1) allowing the auctioning off
of five or more Tiffany items in a single listing and (2) failing to suspend sellers upon learning that the sellers were engaging in infring95
ing activity.
Tiffany has an “About Me” page stating that most of the “Tiffa96
ny” jewelry sold on eBay is counterfeit and is one of VeRO’s most
97
frequent users. Through September 2007, Tiffany reported 284,149
98
listings through VeRO and was among its top ten reporters. Moreover, eBay previously took action when alerted by Tiffany to quickly
remove listings and suspend sellers. The jewelry company could only
point to twenty-three occasions where a seller reported through Ve99
RO resurfaced on eBay under the same registered user name. Nevertheless, eBay does profit off of the sale of Tiffany items regardless of
their authenticity. For example, between April 2000 and June 2004,
eBay earned approximate revenues of $4.1 million from completed
100
auctions with the name “Tiffany” in the listing title.
In 2004, Tiffany, mindful of its trademark being infringed on
eBay, implemented a buying program to purchase jewelry items using
101
the Tiffany trademark in the auction listing or description. Of the
186 pieces of “Tiffany” silver jewelry purchased, seventy-three percent
were counterfeit, and only five percent of the items bought in the in102
vestigation were as advertised.
Litigation ensued shortly after the
103
completion of the buying program.
Sitting without a jury, the district court held that eBay was not li104
able to Tiffany for contributory trademark infringement. Contribu94

First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at ¶¶ 22–23.
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
96
Id. at 479.
97
For instance, Tiffany reported 20,915 listings in 2003; 45,242 listings in 2004;
59,012 listings in 2005; 134,779 in 2006; and 24,201 listings through September 30,
2007. Id. at 484.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 489.
100
The $4.1 million came from 456,551 sales. Id. at 481.
101
First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at ¶ 38.
102
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 482, 485. The remaining purchases were “‘imitations’ that might subject the seller to liability, but they were not technically ‘counterfeit’ because” a Tiffany mark did not appear on them. Parloff, supra note 53.
103
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
104
Id. at 470.
95
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tory trademark infringement is a doctrine judicially constructed by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
105
In Inwood, the Court stated that “liability for
Ives Laboratories, Inc.
trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark of another” and that third parties can be
106
held liable for playing a part in the trademark violation. The Court
also set forth a test to determine if a party should be held liable for
contributory trademark infringement. The Inwood test states,
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another
to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contribu107
torially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.

Subsequent courts have expanded the concept of contributory
trademark infringement beyond the facts of Inwood. In Hard Rock
Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a flea market owner could be
held liable for contributory trademark infringement when flea market vendors sell merchandise illegally bearing a brand owner’s
108
trademark.
Further, in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that
109
it was irrelevant whether the venue involved was online. Rather, the
relevant inquiry for the Inwood test is “the extent of control exercised
110
by the defendant over the third party’s means of infringement.”
Based on these principles, the Tiffany court stated that the Inwood test can be “read to impose liability for contributory trademark
infringement beyond” those who manufacture and distribute the
111
products.
The court found that eBay exercises sufficient control
over its Web sites and users to be within the bounds of the Inwood
112
framework.
Judge Sullivan considered eBay analogous to the flea
market in Hard Rock Café because eBay provides the necessary mar-

105

456 U.S. 844 (1982).
Id. at 853–54.
107
Id. at 854.
108
955 F.2d 1143, 1148–50 (7th Cir. 1992). But in that case, the court found that
there was insufficient evidence to support such a claim. Id. at 1150.
109
194 F.3d 980, 984–85 (9th Cir. 1999).
110
Id. at 984.
111
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
112
See id. at 506.
106
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ketplace for the sale of counterfeit goods, takes an active role in facilitating transactions between buyers and sellers, maintains significant
control over listings on its forums, actively promotes the sale of Tiffany products, and profits from the listing of items and completion of
113
sales.
Under Inwood, Tiffany must prove that eBay continued to supply
its services to “one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging
114
in trademark infringement.” Evidence indicated that eBay had generalized notice that some Tiffany jewelry on its Web site might be
115
Tiffany claimed this generalized knowledge is adecounterfeit.
116
quate to incur liability, but the court disagreed and held that “generalized knowledge is insufficient to impute knowledge of any and
117
The court found that
all instances of infringing activity to eBay.”
Tiffany’s NOCI reporting through VeRO, its buying programs indicating that counterfeit goods were sold, and its removal requests only
provide general knowledge to eBay of illegal activity and were thus
118
insufficient to establish liability.
The court was unwilling to hold eBay liable without specific
knowledge of a particular auction because the amount of illicit list119
ings on eBay is uncertain. The record revealed that authentic Tiffany merchandise was sold on eBay, sometimes in lots of five or more,
which does not support Tiffany’s argument that jewelry sold in bun120
dles is per se indicative of counterfeiting. To hold eBay liable based
on Tiffany’s “five or more” theory would stifle the sale of legitimate
goods on eBay and increase Tiffany’s rights over the use of its mark to
121
the detriment of the consuming public.
Moreover, the court held that eBay’s policing measures, such as
VeRO, adequately attack counterfeiting, because when eBay has specific knowledge of particular infringing listings, it promptly terminates the listings, and when eBay has knowledge of specific counter113

Id. at 506–07.
Id. at 508 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 454 U.S. 844, 854
(1982)).
115
Id. at 508.
116
Id. at 507.
117
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
118
Id.
119
See id. at 508 (stating that courts have been hesitant to extend liability to defendants where the extent of the infringement is unclear).
120
Id. at 509.
121
Id. at 510.
114
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122

feit sellers, it promptly suspends them.
Additionally, the court
stated that even though the burden of policing the trademark rests
123
with Tiffany as the brand owner, and not eBay, eBay’s response
upon receiving notice of specific infringing items is reasonable and
124
appropriate. Specifically, the court referenced eBay’s investment of
millions of dollars to fight counterfeiting, its fraud engine, and its
125
implementation of VeRO.
Also, contrary to the interpretation of
the Paris Commercial Court, Judge Sullivan held that eBay’s institution of new antifraud measures is not a concession of past negli126
gence.
It was simply not technically possible for eBay to have im127
plemented all of its policing measures at an earlier time.
Furthermore, in contrast to the LVMH decisions, the Tiffany
court determined that “rights holders bear the principal responsibili128
ty to police their trademarks.” The court ruled that eBay has no affirmative duty to search for infringing items without specific knowledge provided to it by the brand owner, such as through NOCI
129
reporting. When eBay did have specific knowledge through VeRO
of Tiffany’s “good faith belief” that a particular listing was infringing,
130
eBay reasonably investigated and promptly removed the auction.
Tiffany also claimed that eBay allowed repeat offenders to sell coun131
Nonetheless, the court
terfeit goods after submitting an NOCI.
found that eBay was reasonable in not automatically or permanently
suspending a seller after receiving an NOCI because an NOCI is not a
conclusive determination of counterfeiting but only a good faith be132
lief of infringement.

122

See id. at 515–17.
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
124
Id. at 513.
125
Id. at 514.
126
Id.
127
See id. These additional policing measures include implementing VeRO, delaying the ability to view listings with certain brand names for review purposes, developing the capacity to assess the number of items in a given listing, prohibiting one-day
and three-day auctions of listings with certain brand names, and restricting crossborder trading. Id. at 492.
128
Id. at 518 (citing MDT Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 858 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (“The owner of a trade name must do its own police work.”)).
129
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 515. (“[W]ithout specific knowledge or reason to
know, eBay is under no affirmative duty to ferret out potential infringement.”).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 516.
132
Id. at 516–17.
123
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Additionally, the Tiffany court determined that Tiffany’s desire
to impute generalized knowledge as sufficient to impose liability
would damage the legitimate secondary market of authentic goods
133
that eBay and other markets provide.
Under U.S. law, secondary
134
markets of genuine, brand-name goods are legal.
“As a general
rule, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing
a true mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark own135
er.”
Tiffany requires its jewelry be sold in the United States only
through Tiffany retail stores, Tiffany catalogs, the Tiffany Web site,
136
and Tiffany’s Corporate Sales Department. Tiffany also has a policy
of refusing to sell five of the same new items to any one customer
137
without the approval of a store manager. Nevertheless, the Southern District of New York, contrary to the findings of the Commercial
138
Court of Paris, found that while brand owners have an incentive to
curtail the sale of even authentic goods, the law protects legitimate
139
secondary markets.
Ultimately, Tiffany stands for the principle that the brand owner,
not eBay, has the primary duty to police its forums. But when a
brand owner comes across an infringing item and alerts eBay, eBay
140
must act swiftly with this knowledge to remove the listing.
Only if
eBay has specific knowledge can it be held liable for failing to take action.
In this case, eBay, through VeRO and its other anticounterfeiting initiatives, took reasonable measures to police its Web
141
sites for counterfeit goods. Clearly, the Tiffany decision and the decisions of the Commercial Court of Paris involving LVMH reveal a
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

See id. at 473.
Id. (“[T]he law clearly protects such secondary markets in authentic goods.”).
Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1992).
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 472–73.
Id. at 473.
See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 12.
See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 473. The court stated,
[W]hile rights holders such as Tiffany may have obvious economic incentives to curtail the sale of both counterfeit and authentic goods on
the Internet—after all, every sale of Tiffany jewelry on eBay potentially
represents a lost sales opportunity via Tiffany’s own authorized distribution channels—the law provides protection only from the former,
not the latter. Clearly, eBay and other online market websites may
properly promote and facilitate the growth of legitimate secondary
markets in brand-name goods.

Id.
140
141

See Stone, supra note 11.
See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
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split in authority across countries. For eBay, this country split causes
problematic future ramifications, including questions regarding the
stability of its business model and the threat of increased litigation by
other luxury brands.
C. Additional European Cases Involving eBay’s Liability for
Counterfeit Sales
In addition to the Tiffany and LVMH cases, courts throughout
Europe have dealt with the question of eBay’s liability for counterfeit
sales. Yet, like Tiffany and the LVHM cases, these decisions have not
cleared up the confusion over how to assess eBay’s liability. These
decisions indicate that eBay is more likely to be held liable in Europe;
however, some European courts have interpreted their laws to protect
eBay from liability for the way it regulates its Web sites for counterfeit
142
goods.
143
Courts in France, eBay’s fourth largest market, appear to be
more willing than others to hold eBay liable. Prior to the LVMH decisions, on June 4, 2008, a commercial court sitting in Troyes, France,
ruled in favor of Hermès International, a French luxury retailer, in a
144
lawsuit brought against eBay. The Hermès suit was rather small in
scope, involving just two fake Hermès-branded handbags and one
145
genuine bag listed on eBay’s French site. EBay was required to pay
Hermès 20,000, or approximately $31,000, and to post the ruling on
146
The French court found that
its French site for three months.
“[b]y selling Hermès bags and branded accessories on the eBay.fr site
and by failing to act within their powers to prevent reprehensible use
of the site,” both eBay and the seller “committed acts of counterfeit147
ing.”

142

See Agence France-Presse, EBay Wins Belgian Court Victory Over L’Oréal in Fake
GOOGLE
NEWS,
Aug.
12,
2008,
http://afp.google.com/article/
Case,
ALeqM5hPGbbjTZ-A5swZOUOMuaw1kKNRoQ; Jill Insley, L’Oréal Loses British Court
Battle with eBay, GUARDIAN (London), May 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
technology/2009/may/22/ebay-loreal-court-case-counterfeit; Maija Palmer, Ebay
Wins French L’Oréal Fakes Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 2009, http://blogs.ft.com/
techblog/2009/05/ebay-wins-french-loreal-fakes-lawsuit/; Parloff, supra note 15.
143
Bauerova, supra note 87.
144
See Carol Matlack, Hermès Beats eBay in Counterfeit Case, BUS. WK., June 6, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2008/gb2008066_845380.htm
?campaign_id=rss_daily.
145
Id.
146
Id.; Ram, supra note 55.
147
Matlack, supra note 144.
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Nonetheless, the tide in France may be turning in eBay’s favor.
On May 13, 2009, a French civil court found for eBay in a lawsuit
brought by L’Oréal claiming that eBay was profiting from counterfeit
148
perfume sales. Judge Elisabeth Belfort ruled that eBay “fulfilled its
obligation in good faith” by setting up systems like VeRO to rid the
site of counterfeit listings and was a mere hoster for the sales, not a
149
party to the illegal transactions. Although the French court found
in favor of eBay, that decision was in civil court, while the LVMH cas150
Also, although eBay filed an
es took place in commercial court.
151
appeal, the LVMH award has yet to be reversed, suggesting that the
French courts may still be somewhat adverse to eBay’s business model. If courts in France, which are seen as the strictest in Europe in
terms of fighting counterfeits, are beginning to find for eBay, however, it suggests that eBay is properly policing its listings for illegal
152
goods.
Like France, Germany has previously refused to grant eBay host
protection, and one German court has found eBay liable for allow153
ing—and profiting from—the sale of counterfeit goods.
In 2007,
the German Federal Supreme Court issued a judgment finding eBay
liable to Montres Rolex SA for listing “counterfeit Rolex watches on
154
eBay’s German site.”
The court held that eBay failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the recurrence of counterfeiting once it
155
identified clearly infringing items, which may include items with
156
such a low start price that they are likely counterfeit. The court also
noted that eBay could be liable in some circumstances “upon [the]
157
first notice of infringement.”

148

Eric Pfanner, French Court Clears eBay in Selling Fake Goods, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2009, at B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/technology/
companies/14loreal.html?_r=1.
149
Id.; Palmer, supra note 142.
150
Pfanner, supra note 148.
151
See id.
152
See Palmer, supra note 142.
153
See Ram, supra note 55.
154
Eric Auchard, EBay Dealt Blow on Fake Rolexes by German Court, REUTERS, July 27,
2007, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN2736988920070727.
155
See id.
156
For instance, the court remanded the case to a lower court to determine if the
low start price of a Rolex watch listing, for example less than 800 euros, was sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the listed item was counterfeit. Id.
157
Id.
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Contrary to the interpretation of German and some French
courts, other European courts interpret Article 14 in favor of eBay
and grant it liability protection. On August 12, 2008, the Belgian
Tribunal de Commerce cleared eBay of wrongdoing over the sale of
counterfeit L’Oréal products, primarily Lancôme perfumes, on
158
eBay. The court held that eBay is a passive provider of host services
159
under Article 14 and therefore entitled to liability protection. Simi160
lar to the interpretation of U.S. law in Tiffany, the court also ruled
that eBay did not have a “general monitoring obligation” over what
161
was listed on its sites.
Additionally, in a similar case brought by L’Oréal, the United
Kingdom High Court ruled in May 2009 that eBay “[took] active steps
to prevent or at least minimise [counterfeit] activities” and is there162
fore shielded from liability to L’Oréal for counterfeit sales. The UK
High Court also stated that “[t]he fact that it would be possible for
eBay Europe to do more does not necessarily mean that it is legally
163
obliged to do more, however.”
L’Oréal has not surrendered in its fight against eBay. It has also
filed suit in Germany and Spain over cosmetics sold under such well164
known brands as Lancôme, Ralph Lauren, and Giorgio Armani.
L’Oréal estimates that 50–60 percent of the fragrances sold on eBay
165
bearing its marks are fake.
As evidenced by the cases above, eBay’s liability is determined by
the forum country’s laws, and some jurisdictions are more apt to find
eBay liable than others. Such discrepancies in the law and how
eBay’s policing activities are examined will likely lead to confusion,
high costs, and viability issues for eBay and its users going forward.

158

Parloff, supra note 15.
See id.
160
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2008),
aff’d, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
161
Agence France-Presse, supra note 142.
162
Insley, supra note 142.
163
Id.
164
Matlack, supra note 144; see also L’Oréal Sues eBay Over Counterfeit Goods,
REGISTER,
Sept.
13,
2007,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/09/13/
loreal_sues_ebay.
165
Alissa Demorest, Faking It, INT’L COSMETIC NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007 (LexisNexis retrieved Sept. 1, 2008).
159
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IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE COUNTRY SPLITS
The lack of uniformity among nations dealing with similar fact
patterns in a global economic environment has potentially severe ramifications for eBay. These include a flood of lawsuits where eBay’s
liability is dependent on the plaintiff’s choice of forum, higher litigation costs, the implementation of new anti-counterfeiting measures, a
possible alteration of its business model, and a disruption of legitimate secondary markets.
A. Potential Flood of Lawsuits in Forums Unfavorable to eBay
Brand owners appear unwilling to put in the time or incur the
cost to pursue individual counterfeiters who peddle illegal goods on
166
eBay. They prefer instead to seek out a prime, exposed, and, most
importantly, wealthy target to sue, and eBay is an entity that fits that
167
mold. EBay must work efficiently to deter these counterfeiting lawsuits to prevent future litigation by other companies with deep coffers
who, seeing an opportunity for a large judgment, may be willing to
168
take the risk to prevent sales on eBay. This risk is also justified by
luxury-brand owners because if they do not take action against eBay,
the brand owner’s reputation may suffer if its counterfeit merchandise floods the market, which may diminish the brand’s status among
169
consumers.
Some nations appear more willing than others to hold eBay liable, emboldening luxury brands to file suit in favorable forums.
Thus, luxury brands whose items are sold across the world or that are
based in a country where liability is more likely to be found can sue
eBay in multiple forums at the same time to hedge their bets and im-

166

See Ronald J. Mann, Emerging Frameworks for Policing Internet Intermediaries, J.
INTERNET L., Dec. 2006, at 3, 8–9.
167
See Jess Cartner-Morley, In Search of the Real Deal, GUARDIAN (London), July 2,
2008, at 15, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jul/02/
ebay.consumeraffairs.
168
See Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 14 (“Because many wellknown companies with deep pockets could file similar complaints, eBay must work to
resolve this situation in a way that will placate or deter other potential corporate
plaintiffs. Otherwise, eBay might be faced with a flood of lawsuits . . . .”); see also Demorest, supra note 165 (noting that beauty-product companies took a first step by
prosecuting individual online vendors but that such efforts have been fruitless).
169
See Handbagged; EBay’s Legal Woes, supra note 35, at 76. According to the general counsel of Gucci Group, “We don’t make any money from sales on eBay, but we
have to tell people that their bag isn’t real, that we can’t help them get their money
back, and we become the bad guys.” Id.
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prove their chances at victory. This is the strategy L’Oréal employed
in choosing to sue eBay in the UK, Germany, Spain, France, and Bel170
gium.
In addition, luxury brands have the ability to employ a “wait and
see” approach to litigation. If a particular forum appears more likely
to find liability, such as France or Germany, other luxury brands can
pounce on the judgment, sue in that particular forum, and claim the
171
previous cases as precedent. For instance, if a luxury brand based
in France, or whose brand is falsely peddled on eBay in France, considers the LVMH award of approximately $63 million and the judgment in favor of Hermès, the brand is more likely to file suit there
due to France’s interpretation of eBay’s status under French law and
Article 14. And when eBay is litigating in countries that have previously held it liable, eBay has more difficulty arguing that its policing
efforts are sufficient to prevent liability for the sale of counterfeit
goods.
Another dilemma that may prompt a flood of litigation is the potential disparity in how European nations interpret their own laws
and directives. German and some French courts are unwilling to give
eBay “hoster” protection under Article 14, but Belgium and the UK
ruled that eBay is a passive provider of “host” services and therefore
172
entitled to liability protection.
Consequently, even when applying
the same standard throughout Europe, eBay’s liability may depend
on circumstances over which it has little control, namely the forum in
which the luxury brand files suit.
Moreover, as seen in the LVMH cases and the Tiffany decision,
courts around the world have vastly different interpretations of
“knowledge.” Both European nations that have adopted Article 14
and the United States use some form of a knowledge test. While
France and Germany may interpret actual knowledge to mean a more
general knowledge of counterfeiting activity, the district court in Tiffany found that general knowledge is insufficient to impose liability;
eBay must have specific knowledge of an infringing listing and fail to
170

See supra notes 148–49, 158–65 and accompanying text.
See Rosencrance, supra note 19 (“[L]uxury goods makers are waiting to see the
outcome of eBay’s appeal to determine whether they will also go after eBay for allowing the sale of counterfeit goods.”); see also Jagger, supra note 17, at 42 (stating that “a
ruling against eBay . . . would unleash similar lawsuits” and encourage other designers to file suit).
172
Parloff, supra note 15 (“In contrast, the German and French courts had found
that the ‘host’ service exception did not protect eBay because of the active role eBay
plays in making sales happen and the fact that it takes a commission on every sale.”).
171
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173

adequately act on that knowledge. Thus, the differing decisions in
the United States and Europe, as well as a split among Article 14 interpretations, expose eBay to exploratory litigation, brands suing in
multiple forums to increase their odds and recovery awards, and other companies waiting in the wings to pounce on precedent.
B. Adverse Judgments Can Bring Significant Costs to eBay and its
Business Model
The disparity in determining eBay’s liability can bring about significant costs to eBay, including the costs of litigation, settlements,
and alterations to its business model. The biggest costs facing eBay
are large judgments, such as the $63 million owed to the brands of
174
LVMH. In addition, if eBay is forced to litigate in countries such as
France and Germany, where it has been held liable in the past, eBay
may decide to settle with the brand owner, which can also add signifi175
cant costs. Such settlements can prompt “wait and see” litigation by
brand owners seeking relief from eBay who may not want to risk litigation in eBay-friendly forums. Furthermore, if eBay begins to lose
or settle a higher percentage of its cases, eBay’s argument that it is
doing enough to police its forums for counterfeit goods will lack credibility. Adverse judgments and a higher duty imposed by some European courts may limit eBay’s ability to maintain its laissez-faire
business model. EBay’s business model is premised on providing only a venue for buyers and sellers to negotiate while refraining from
taking part in the actual transaction, never taking possession of the
item or vetting the product, and only removing a listing if prompted
176
by a claim of infringement.
EBay’s liability for counterfeit sales
around the world will surely impose higher duties on it in nations
where it is found liable for failing to take action and profiting from
the sales. Therefore, with unsympathetic courts deeming eBay’s
business model inadequate, eBay will have to adjust the way it does
business, creating substantial barriers to commerce.

173

See Ed Shanahan, Tiffany v. eBay Appeal Grabs Second Circuit Spotlight, AM. LAW
DAILY, July 16, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/07/tiffany-vebay-appeal-grabs-second-circuit-spotlight.html (last updated July 17, 2009).
174
Bauerova, supra note 87.
175
See Hafner, supra note 56 (stating that, according to an intellectual property
attorney, “[t]he cost implied is tremendous” if eBay begins settling cases with brand
owners).
176
See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 913, 915–16.
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For instance, eBay may have to police its Web site in different
ways in different countries. EBay may need to adopt new policing
and regulatory measures in some nations while maintaining the status
177
quo in others. Millions of dollars will have to be employed to enact
new takedown measures, policing procedures, and counterfeitdetection programs to abide by a particular jurisdiction’s interpreta178
tion of the law. This would be in addition to the $20 million eBay
spends annually and the more than two thousand individuals eBay
179
employs to combat counterfeiting. EBay will also have to set up custom policing standards based on a particular country’s laws. In turn,
this may diminish consumer choice and reduce the ability of users
180
from different parts of the world to do business with one another.
Increasing eBay’s costs of doing business and detrimentally affecting its business model will not abruptly end all counterfeiting activity on eBay. As long as fraud is inherent in the eBay model, no
new, stricter, and costlier policing methods will prevent all types of
181
counterfeit operations on eBay. Even so, eBay contends that only a
182
small share of the goods sold on eBay are counterfeit; yet eBay may
not be able to do much more beyond its current methods. When
counterfeit goods are located, the listing is removed, but due to the
size of eBay and the number of transactions occurring at any given
time, it may not be possible for eBay to police its sites to the high
standards desired by some European courts without destroying its
business model. It is simply unrealistic to assume that eBay can know
the exact contents of each and every one of its estimated 2.7 billion
annual listings or determine the content of a listing without coming
183
into possession of the item.
Requiring more might force eBay to
physically take possession of certain items, like specific luxury items

177

See Stone, supra note 11.
See id. (stating that “eBay would be legally required to do more abroad to fight
counterfeiting than it is required to do at home”).
179
Press Release, eBay Inc., supra note 51.
180
See Rosencrance, supra note 19. According to eBay spokeswoman Nichola
Sharpe, “If we have to change our business in relation to this ruling, it will be a massive undertaking.” Id.
181
See Stone, supra note 50 (reporting a statement by former eBay CEO Meg
Whitman that “[f]raud is inherent in marketplaces of our scale”).
182
Katie Hafner, supra note 56, at 1.
183
Insley, supra note 142.
178
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or higher-priced listings, or to take down particular categories
185
where counterfeit trading is most prominent.
Increased costs in paying out judgments and settlements, as well
as increased policing expenses, might force eBay to pass the financial
186
burden on to its users. For instance, eBay can impose fee increases
on sellers for completing transactions or even a fee for simply regis187
tering with eBay.
Also, if the costs became too burdensome, eBay
188
might be forced to stop auctioning off certain trademarked goods.
Moreover, negative media attention discussing eBay as a hotbed for
counterfeit goods can damage its reputation among current and potential users, thereby adversely affecting the volume of transactions
189
and eBay’s business. If users or potential users become inundated
with reports of counterfeit-goods trafficking on eBay, they will surely
be less likely to trade within the forum. Thus, only high-volume buyers and sellers might want to take advantage of the service eBay provides, for excessive fees and heightened regulatory standards would
190
outweigh the benefits to small-time buyers and sellers.
Finally,
higher costs may also prevent eBay from investing in newer technologies to expand and improve eBay’s potential as an arena for global
191
commerce for buyers and sellers. If eBay must expend millions of
dollars and devote countless resources to attain an unreasonably high
184

See Bray, supra note 57.
See Matlack, supra note 18.
186
See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 273 (2005) (“It is well recognized that imposing liability
on intermediaries will affect the services and prices they present to their customers.”).
187
See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 939.
188
See id.
189
See Demorest, supra note 165.
190
See Mann, supra note 166, at 7 (stating that “especially as the cost of liability to
the gatekeepers increases significantly, the problem may spiral out of control, such
that the only remaining customers will be those who use the gatekeeper’s services in
highly rewarding ways”). Moreover:
Imposing liability on gatekeepers will result in the unraveling of the
market when the fee hike under gatekeeper liability makes the cost of
entering the market exceed the value attached to the market by lawabiding clients. As law-abiding clients start departing, gatekeepers update their fees to reflect the increase in the proportion of wrongdoers
in the prospective client pool, which, in turn, further encourages lawabiding clients to abandon the market.
Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 74 (2003).
191
See Mann & Belzley, supra note 186, at 273–74 (noting that a risk exists that imposing burdens on intermediaries will chill the activities of buyers and sellers).
185
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policing standard, it is less likely to invest in developing a better marketplace for its users. Therefore, adverse judgments and higher standards for eBay might mean significantly higher costs to the auction
house.
C. Disruption of Legitimate Secondary Markets
Although the prevention of counterfeit sales is the chief concern
in the litigation involving eBay, a secondary reason that luxury-brand
owners have sought to take eBay to court is to prevent the distribu192
tion of their trademarked goods in legitimate secondary markets.
Many luxury-brand owners tightly control distribution networks for
their products, such as by only using their own shops or a few autho193
rized distributors.
Having their legitimate goods listed on eBay
prevents these owners from maintaining the desired control over
their products.
For instance, in the LVMH cases, the court not only determined
that eBay was a broker that actively participated in and profited from
the sale of counterfeit goods, but the court also issued an injunction
against eBay to stop all sales of legitimate LVMH perfumes manufac194
tured by Guerlain, Givenchy, Christian Dior, and Kenzo. If such a
result becomes commonplace, luxury brands will essentially be able
to control the distribution of their genuine products even after the
first sale to prevent them from being resold in the future at lower
prices, preventing those on the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder from accessing “luxury” merchandise.
EBay is keenly aware of such a ramification. Following the
LVMH decision, an eBay press release recognized,
It is clear that eBay has become a focal point for certain brand
owners’ desire to exact ever greater control over e-commerce.
....
The ruling . . . seeks to impact the sale of second-hand goods as
well as new genuine products, effectively reaching into homes and
rolling back the clock on the Internet and liberty it has
created. . . . [C]ounterfeit suits are being used by certain brand

192
See Roger Parloff, EBay Denied Stay in LVMH Case, FORTUNE, July 11, 2008,
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/07/11/ebay-denied-stay-in-lvmh-case/.
193
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 472–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2008),
aff’d, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
194
Press Release, eBay.fr, supra note 89.
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owners as a stalking-horse issue to reinforce their control over the
195
market.

The European Community, through Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”), authorizes brand
owners to use “selective distribution,” which allows manufacturers to
196
essentially control how and where their products are sold.
But
manufacturers must abide by certain requirements. “Firstly, the nature of the product in question must necessitate a selective distribution system. Secondly, resellers must be chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature. Thirdly, the criteria laid down
197
must not go beyond what is necessary.” To satisfy Article 81(3) of
the EC Treaty, the selective distribution must improve production
and distribution, promote progress, and not have a significantly ad198
verse effect on consumers.
The French opinion enjoining eBay from allowing its site to be
used for certain genuine perfumes is inconsistent with U.S. law,
which allows the sale of authentic products through unauthorized
199
channels. As stated in the Tiffany decision, “[T]he law clearly pro200
tects such secondary markets in authentic goods,” and “eBay and
other online market websites may properly promote and facilitate the
195

Press Release, eBay Inc., supra note 51.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN EU COMPETITION POLICY:
ANTITRUST AND CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS 45 (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/glossary_en.pdf.
197
Id. at 41–42.
198
Article 81(3) states, in pertinent part, that selective distribution is permitted in
the case of the following:
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
81(3), Mar. 25, 1957, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 64–65.
199
Parloff, supra note 192 (referring to the LVMH injunction as one that “bans socalled gray-market sales—sales of genuine products through unauthorized channels—which are not considered illegal in the United States, but are in France”).
200
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
196
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201

growth of legitimate secondary markets.”
Although Tiffany and
other brand owners have an incentive to curtail this activity, which
may diminish their particular brand’s reputation and prevent them
from earning a profit from the secondary sales, American law protects
such markets.
Even though secondary markets are legal in the United States,
eBay might still have to remove listings to avoid the possibility that an
international transaction might involve a buyer or seller in a European nation that does not allow secondary markets. For example, if a
U.S. merchant legally posts an authentic bottle of Christian Dior perfume on eBay, but a French buyer illegally purchases it, LVMH could
enforce the French court’s injunction against eBay and subject it to a
202
fine of $80,000. Such an effect chills commerce in secondary markets, which may be exactly what the luxury-brand owners are seeking
to accomplish, namely preventing their brand from being listed on
eBay in any form, whether counterfeit or authentic.
V. EBAY’S CURRENT POLICING METHODS ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE
RIGHTS OF BRAND OWNERS AND SHOULD SHIELD
EBAY FROM LIABILITY
EBay’s current efforts to prevent and curtail the distribution of
counterfeit goods are reasonable, efficient, and adequately enforced
and should therefore shield the auction house from liability. In addition, the Tiffany court was correct in its decision that the onus should
be on brand owners to take the primary role in policing for counter203
feit goods. This is not to say that eBay has no duty to brand owners;
eBay must work with brand owners when necessary to remove illegal
listings. EBay’s current policy of removing items while engaging with
brand owners is the most practical and effective remedy available. Although illegal sales still occur, eBay currently takes an active role in
removing illicit listings, both on its own and with the help of brand
owners, and has a track record of serving as an effective source of en204
forcement.
Nonetheless, several criticisms of eBay’s approach to counterfeit
goods can be made. First, critics assert that eBay’s business model ac-

201

Id.
See Parloff, supra note 192.
203
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
204
See Mann & Belzley, supra note 186, at 262 (discussing the possibility that intermediaries can effectively enforce regulations).
202
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tually promotes the sale of counterfeit goods by providing a laissez205
faire marketplace for buyers and sellers to interact.
The auction
house provides the forum and derives revenue, but does little to monitor the actual listings unless prompted by a brand owner or eBay user. EBay makes possible the posting of a counterfeit listing by providing the technology to allow an auction to function, but it only
engages in transactions by e-mailing the winning bidder auction—
206
allowing users to act in relative anonymity. Anonymity allows those
who peddle in counterfeit goods to do so with greater protection,
207
enabling illegal transactions to occur.
Second, critics argue that eBay is in the best position to search
for and remove counterfeit listings. EBay authorizes the listings to be
posted and therefore should know what it is allowing to be sold in its
forums. Because eBay has constructed its marketplace, it is “more
adept at searching and monitoring its marketplace” than brand own208
ers.
Furthermore, critics contend that eBay has sufficient control
over the sales by requiring users to sign a User Agreement, removing
listings, and suspending buyers and sellers. Also, eBay is aware that
counterfeit activity is a problem in its marketplace. Thus, luxury
brands can fervently assert that eBay is in a better position to protect
their trademarks by detecting and removing listings of counterfeit
goods and should thus be held to a higher standard than that imposed in Tiffany.
A third and final criticism is that the volume of sales and anonymity of eBay users put brand owners in a position where eBay ap209
pears to be the only entity from which to seek relief.
Critics contend that, even if eBay is making inroads in deterring illegal sales,
brand owners should not be forced to bear responsibility for a problem that is not only eBay’s creation, but from which eBay is earning,
210
and will continue to earn, substantial revenues.
Until the sale of
counterfeit goods hurts eBay financially, such as through high damage awards to luxury brands, eBay might not do what is necessary to

205

See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 932.
See id. at 933; see also Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 10.
207
See Mann & Belzley, supra note 186, at 246 (stating “the anonymity that the Internet fosters has made it easier to buy and sell counterfeit goods”).
208
Id. at 278.
209
See Favre, supra note 1, at 168 (noting that the “anonymity of buyers and sellers,
the vast quantity of goods passing through the site, and the short timeframe of auctions” impedes the ability to pursue individual counterfeiters).
210
See Mann, supra note 166, at 6.
206
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prevent illicit trading from continuing. By holding eBay accountable,
it will be forced to invest more resources into preventing infringe211
ment.
Despite these criticisms, eBay’s policing activities are reasonable
and should shield it from liability. As a starting point, the brand
owner, being the expert in its own products, is in the best position to
determine which products are genuine and which are counterfeit.
EBay is not as effective in searching for counterfeit products, given
that it is not an expert in the field, has hundreds of millions of list212
ings at any given time, and never takes possession of the listed item.
Putting all of the burden on eBay could force eBay to take down legitimate goods out of fear that they may be counterfeit. While this may
indeed be a motive of luxury-brand owners who seek to further control the channels of distribution, U.S. law does not prohibit the sale
213
of authentic products in the secondary market.
Brand owners are
in reality more effective in distinguishing between counterfeit and
genuine products. These brand owners design, manufacture, and
distribute these items. EBay performs none of these tasks. Hence,
cooperation between eBay and the brand owner is the most optimal
way to limit illicit sales.
In addition, it is clear that eBay promptly removes illicit items
214
upon notice from the brand owner.
EBay’s current takedown system is the ideal method to police for counterfeit goods as compared
to a policy that subjects eBay to liability for each illegal sale. It is impossible to comply with a mandate to remove every counterfeit listing,
but a requirement to remove listings when prompted by the brand
215
owner is reasonable, practical, and effective.
In addition, only a

211

See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 938.
Mann, supra note 166, at 9. Also, according to eBay spokesman Hani Durzy,
As a marketplace, we never take possession of any of the goods sold on
the site, so it would be impossible for us to solely determine the authenticity of an item . . . . And we go above and beyond what the law
requires us to do to keep counterfeits off the site.
Hafner, supra note 5.
213
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
214
See id. at 516.
215
Statistics indicate that items alerted through eBay are removed 90 percent of
the time within twenty-four hours, 70–80 percent of the time within twelve hours,
and 75 percent of the time within four hours. Id. at 478; Parloff, supra note 53.
212
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small share of the millions of listings on eBay at any given time are
216
counterfeit.
While eBay is in a position to prevent and detect, brand owners
must take a principal role in the process. Holding eBay liable for
each counterfeit sale is impracticable and will only push those who
trade in illicit goods away from eBay and into another forum. This
would also leave buyers and sellers of legitimate items, including
those who make a living from eBay, with limited options in seeking to
217
acquire and sell unique items at a lower transaction cost. Thus, the
risk of imposing a heightened duty on eBay, beyond what it already
does to police, will likely chill the sale of legitimate goods and servic218
es.
Moreover, simply because eBay is an easy target does not mean
that imposing liability is justified. EBay’s investment is already vast,
and some type of fraud will always occur on eBay regardless of the effectiveness of an anti-counterfeiting program. EBay already spends
$20 million a year, employs thousands, and has its own brand and
reputation at stake to motivate it to combat counterfeiting effectively.
Developing a reputation for combating fraudulent activity in its
marketplace helps eBay establish a heightened trust with users, potential users, those willing to do business with eBay, and regulators
219
who might otherwise decide to look at eBay with a closer eye.
A
reputation that it does little to stop counterfeiting would taint eBay’s
220
goodwill, erode user trust, and as a result, impair eBay’s business.
Consequently, eBay and brand owners share a mutual interest in limiting the expansion of counterfeit-goods trafficking. Simply creating unreasonable expectations would not make eBay any more effective or diligent in searching for and removing counterfeit goods.
Under the standard applied in Tiffany, eBay will still be held liable if it does not take effective action and fails to remove items that it

216

See Hafner, supra note 175. EBay estimates the amount to be about six thousand. Id.
217
See Hamdani, supra note 190, at 74.
218
See Mann & Belzley, supra note 186, at 274.
219
See Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 23 (“[E]Bay has likely become . . . involved in fraud protection . . . to encourage transactions and build the
trust of its users, to respond to strong outside pressure . . . and avoid the specter of
outside regulation, and to reduce the possibility that its users might . . . resort to selfhelp tactics harmful to eBay’s business.”).
220
See id. at 32 (stating that eBay has a strong motivation to combat fraud “because it harms eBay’s business by tarnishing its goodwill and eroding user trust”).
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221

knows or should know are counterfeit.
For instance, if eBay has
specific knowledge from its own research or from a VeRO member
that an item is counterfeit and fails to act, it will be liable to the brand
owner for allowing the sale to occur. Allowing eBay to remain on the
offensive, but without the fear of judgments in the tens of millions of
dollars, enables eBay to expand its research and development into
better technology to provide both consumer and brand protection.
It is good business for eBay to prevent counterfeit sales in its forums
and even more beneficial to its reputation to be able to say that its actions work.
Additionally, VeRO is an effective answer to counterfeit sales,
both in theory and in practice. It is an existing infrastructure that recognizes the problem and works together with the brand owner to
find the solution. Through VeRO, eBay acknowledges that both sides
can work together to effectively police trademark infringement and
that while eBay may have some control over its forums, brand owners
are better able to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit
222
items.
Putting the heavier burden on eBay, without the assistance from
brand owners, will put unreasonable pressure on eBay’s business
model and harm both eBay and its millions of users. Fee increases,
subscription costs, and heavy investments into policing procedures
are no guarantee that counterfeit sales will cease. Imposing such
immense pressure and unreasonable standards on eBay or other online auction houses to rid their forums of counterfeit goods may
prove eBay’s current business model unworkable.
Furthermore, while heightened standards may satisfy the goal of
luxury brand owners of seeking to prevent eBay from operating in its
current form, eBay’s business practices satisfy both the Inwood test
and Article 14. The Inwood test and Article 14 both give eBay the liability protection it needs when actual knowledge of infringing activity
is absent. Inwood holds a defendant liable for contributory trademark
infringement if it intentionally induces a third party to engage in
trademark infringement and knows or has reason to know such activi223
ty is ongoing. Article 14 holds an intermediary, such as eBay, liable
if the intermediary has actual knowledge or awareness and fails to
221
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2008),
aff’d, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
222
See Favre, supra note 1, at 172, 175.
223
Id. at 180 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 454 U.S. 844, 854
(1982)).
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remove or disable access to illegal information, and Article 14 also
denies liability protection when the eBay user is acting under the in224
ducement, authority, or control of the provider.
Like the Inwood
test, Article 14 does not hold an intermediary liable when the intermediary does not have actual knowledge of the illegal activity and
225
does not control the user.
Actual knowledge should be interpreted under the “specific
226
A “specific knowknowledge” interpretation applied in Tiffany.
ledge” test is the most practical and reasonable standard to place on
eBay, but it can also efficiently and effectively serve the ultimate purpose of ridding eBay of counterfeit goods. When eBay has specific
knowledge, it acts expeditiously to remove listings that are likely to be
227
counterfeit.
The French LVMH court, however, appeared to interpret actual knowledge differently—as eBay’s general knowledge of
228
counterfeit activity occurring on its forums.
Moreover, the Paris
Commercial Court stated that eBay’s addition of new procedures to
police counterfeit activity was an admission that it had been negligent
229
in removing counterfeit listings. This is inconsistent with the Tiffany court’s finding that as eBay developed new technology to combat
the problem, it implemented these measures to better police its Web
230
sites and not to simply correct past mistakes. New eBay programs,
such as VeRO, are instituted as technology progresses to better address the counterfeiting issue, which eBay has taken seriously since its
231
inception.
In addition, while eBay has some control over users, it operates
under a laissez-faire business model that does not entail direct involvement in the actual transaction. EBay, although retroactively
present in the form of taking action after the user has already acted,
does little to prevent the user of its service from placing a counterfeit
good up for auction. Therefore, eBay’s business model satisfies the

224

Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13.
See id.
226
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
227
Id. at 515 (“[T]he record reveals that when eBay became aware, through its
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See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 11.
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at 12.
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See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
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“control” requirement under Article 14(2) to be entitled to liability
232
protection. Users control their own accounts, decide whether to list
or buy items, control the length of the auction, and work together
233
with buyers to decide on payment and shipping methods. EBay can
shut down listings or suspend users but only upon the request of buyers or brand owners who believe an item is counterfeit. This process
should satisfy both the Tiffany ruling’s actual/specific knowledge test
and Article 14’s requirement of acting quickly to remove infringing
material. Thus, coupled with eBay’s reasonable, efficient, and effective response to brand owners who can bring attention to counterfeit
listings, eBay should escape liability under both Inwood and Article 14.
Brand owners are better off partnering with eBay to fight counterfeiting than remaining on the outside and seeking to bring litigation. Companies whose brands are counterfeited can alert eBay and
force it to take down illicit listings, and if eBay does not take such an
action upon specific knowledge, brand owners should have legal recourse against the auction house.
VI. THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT
AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Because different countries have interpreted eBay’s liability in
vastly contrasting ways, one possible solution is to provide a framework for courts around the world to analyze cases involving the sale
of counterfeit goods on eBay in a consistent, uniform manner. A potential answer is the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
234
(ACTA) that is currently in the early stages of development. Participants engaged in ACTA negotiations include the United States, the
members of the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea,
235
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and Switzerland.
The ACTA attempts to fight counterfeiting in three ways: (1) by
building international cooperation and harmonizing communication

232

See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 14(2), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13.
Favre, supra note 1, at 193.
234
See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Schwab
Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-newtrade-agreement-fight-fakes.
235
Press Release, European Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting: EU, U.S. and Others
Meet in Washington to Advance ACTA (July 31, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/intell_property/pr310708_en.
htm; Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 234.
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and standards between nations, (2) establishing common enforcement practices to protect brand owners, and (3) creating a common
and modern legal framework to deal with counterfeiting issues in the
236
global economy.
The negotiations behind the ACTA have been
kept relatively secret thus far, so the official positions taken by the
parties involved regarding auction-house liability for counterfeit sales
237
are unclear at this point. Nonetheless, the negotiations provide an
opportunity to seek uniformity and cooperation in attacking the issue
of counterfeit goods in online auctions.
Additionally, the ACTA provides the opportunity for nations
with differing standards for assessing auction-house liability to come
together to craft a uniform standard to help not only eBay, but brand
238
owners as well, in attempting to prevent counterfeit sales. In creating a common legal framework to enforce anti-counterfeiting policy,
it is possible for the countries to provide safeguards for auction houses like eBay by allowing them to operate their business while at the
same time requiring cooperation with brand owners in seeking to
eliminate counterfeit goods from the online marketplace. This
framework can require the specific knowledge test of Tiffany to be the
standard: if eBay has specific knowledge of infringing material, it
239
must take quick action to remove such material or face liability.
An ACTA provision involving auction-house liability can give
eBay predictability in deciding how to run its business without having
to worry about litigating in forums that are known to be unfavorable
to its business model. Realistically, however, it will be difficult to extend to eBay internationally the protection that it appears to have
under U.S. law, especially with the EU, which has a strong stance
against eBay and secondary markets, as a participant. Yet, uniformity
is needed, and the ACTA is currently an option toward harmonizing

236

OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
FACT SHEET: ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT 1–2 (2007), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file122_13414.pdf; Press Release, European Comm’n, supra note 235.
237
See Press Release, Found. for Free Info. Infrastructure, EU Council Refuses to
Release Secret ACTA Documents (Nov. 10, 2008), http://press.ffii.org/
Press_releases/EU_Council_refuses_to_release_secret_ACTA_documents.
238
One of the expressed areas of interest to create uniform measures of enforcement is in “Internet distribution and internet technology.” OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 236, at 2.
239
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2008),
aff’d, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
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the standard that eBay has to satisfy to escape liability. Uniformity
will avoid problems associated with having a legal transaction take
place in the U.S. that is illegal under French law and with eBay’s remedial actions (in taking down infringing listings) being considered
sufficient in the United States or Belgium but not in France or Germany. The ACTA can also prevent the confusion over how EU Member States interpret Article 14. Presently, some nations, like France
and Germany, interpret the provision to deny eBay protection, but
Belgium holds to the contrary. Therefore, the ACTA is an option
that can be pursued to promote uniformity in assessing eBay’s liability
to brand owners.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the recent Tiffany and LVMH decisions, eBay’s liability to brand owners for the sale of counterfeit items remains unresolved on a world-wide basis. The two cases, although containing similar facts, reached drastically different conclusions, leaving eBay to
face potential situations where its liability remains unknown.
EBay’s predicament is largely dependent on the plaintiff’s
choice of forum. The Tiffany decision, based on U.S. law, indicates
that eBay will not be held liable if it fails to take action when it has
merely generalized knowledge of counterfeit sales but may be liable if
it fails to act upon specific knowledge, either through its own investigation or through VeRO. A French or German court, on the other
hand, will likely not give eBay liability protection in a similar context.
EBay will thus be held liable for facilitating and profiting from the
sale of counterfeit goods in these forums when it has general knowledge of counterfeiting. Yet, as a Belgian court ruling has shown, Article 14 can be interpreted differently among European nations and
in favor of eBay. These country splits can lead to drastic ramifications
for eBay, such as a flood of litigation by luxury brands against eBay in
favorable forums, increased costs that may be passed on to eBay users,
threats to eBay’s business model, and the removal of genuine luxury
goods from secondary markets.
Nevertheless, eBay’s current policing measures, most notably
VeRO, are sufficient, reasonable, and effective in combating counterfeit sales. Working with brand owners is the key to stopping this
fraud. It is unrealistic to compel eBay to prevent every illegal sale;
therefore, eBay needs to rely on the expertise of brand owners, and
brand owners need to rely on the ability of eBay to take action when
appropriate. EBay has shown a willingness to act when it needs to do
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so. Brand owners need to take some responsibility for protecting
their trademarks, and holding eBay to the higher standard of some
European courts would threaten eBay’s business model and the legitimate service it provides to willing customers all over the world.
The ACTA is a possible answer to the issue of addressing eBay’s
liability. Although it is a formidable task to get countries with differing opinions to come together on a uniform standard, it is the best
solution to the current uncertainty. The ACTA should place a duty
on eBay to remove a listing when eBay has specific knowledge of an
alleged counterfeit listing, such as when it knows or should know that
the auction is illegitimate through its own investigation or upon information that the brand owner supplies. Such a uniform standard
would prevent the confusion, irregularity, and unfairness in judgments where liability has and will continue to appear to be based on
the forum in which the lawsuit against eBay is filed.

